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Six ways are surveyed in which a single phonological stem can
correspond to material with different syntactic distributions, mean-
ings, or uses: synchronically unsystematic identities of stems for dif-
ferent lexemes; three types of systematic grammatical relationships
(zero derivation, alternative subcategories, and systematic subsenses);
and two types of systematic extragrammatical relationships (extra-
grammatical conventions of use and nonconventional pure coercion).
The impetus for this brief note 1 was the claim, by Charles Fillmore and Paul Kay,
in a manuscript draft,2 that various uses of the same stem in different syntactic
contexts result from zero derivations, 'phonologically vacuous constructions of
derivational morphology' (a.k.a. conversions). The relationships in question in-
clude those between the a and b examples below.
( 1
)
a. She threw a rock.
b. She threw me a rock.
(2) a. Ann opened a can of peas.
b. Ann opened Bob a can of peas.
(3) a. The top spun.
b. Nell spun the top.
(4) a. Nell spun the top.
b. Nell spun the top off the table.
My goal in this note is not to decide whether such claims are true, or even to
muse about them. 3 I have the much more modest aim of trying to enumerate the
ways in which 'same phonology, different synsem' 4 can come about: material
which corresponds to stems with the same phonological makeup (P), but which
has different syntactic distributions, meanings, or uses (SI, S2). There are at least
six different cases, Types through 5 below. 5
An Exclusion
Type 0. Phenomena to exclude. I put aside relationships between SI and
S2 that are not systematic. The unsystematic examples include those where the
morphology indicates no special relationship (permission ALLOW in Sandy al-
lowed them to go and speech-report allow in Sandy grudgingly allowed that
they had gone) and those where it does (activity DO in Yes, I did it and suppor-
tive DO in / DID think that was odd, which share their extraordinary morphology).
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These pairs involve clearly different lexemes, but the lexemes share phonol-
ogy (and sometimes morphology as well). I would imagine that some speakers
treat them as quite unrelated, while other speakers perceive some sort of relation-
ship. But, in any case, there are not parallel relationships running across many dif-
ferent examples. In all of the remaining types there are; these are the types I'm
really concerned with.
Grammatical Relationships
At least three types of systematic relationships are, it seems to me, pretty
clearly matters of grammar.
Type 1. Zero derivation. In this type, the relationship between SI and S2 is
a relationship between the syntax/semantics of distinct lexemes - just as in eve-
ryday (non-zero) derivation, except that the corresponding phonological proper-
ties, PI and P2, are identical.
As an example, consider the relationship between manner-of-speaking verbs
(whine, scream, whisper, etc.) and the corresponding nouns (Zwicky 1971): Kim
whined mournfully; Kim gave a mournful whine. This example is clearly
'category changing', but nothing I know of would require that zero derivation
involve distinct major categories. So the relationships between the a and b verbs
in (1) through (4) are candidates for classification as zero derivation - as a matter
of rules of grammar (of morphology, in particular) relating pairs of lexemes (that is,
relating their phonological, morphological, morphosyntactic, syntactic, and se-
mantic properties).
Type 2. Alternative subcategories. An intuition many linguists have had
- an intuition I tend to share - is that the lexeme give in / gave a book to Terry is
the same as the one in / gave Terry a book: same phonology, morphology, major
syntactic category, and semantics. Nevertheless, the two are instances of some-
what different syntactic subcategories (each corresponding to a syntactic con-
struction in which the lexeme can serve as head). That is, among the syntactic
properties of this lexeme are the two: (1) eligible to be head in construction 51
(TO-dative) and (2) eligible to be head in construction 52 (double NP object).
(I'm not proposing a system of representation here. All I care about is that
properties (1) and (2) can somehow be associated with the lexeme give. This can
be achieved by brute force - listing subcat(head, 51) and subcat(head, 52) among
the properties of give - or by predicting (1) and (2), by general principles, from!
the semantics of give, or by something in between.)
If the give example seems unconvincing to you, there are plenty of uncon-
troversial examples. The English auxiliaries, for example, are all verbs that are eli-
gible to be head in a number of distinct constructions: clausal negation realized as
an inflectional property of the head V (/ won't do it), clausal negation realized by
not located after the head V (/ will not do it), ellipsis of a complement after the
head V (/ said I'd do it, and I will), etc. We don't want to say that must in You
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mustn't touch that, You must not touch that, I don't have to touch that, but you
must, etc. are instances of different lexemes.
The a and b examples in (1) through (4) above are excellent candidates for
analysis as the same verb lexeme (throw, open, spin, and spin, respectively) with
two different subcategorizations. The intuition behind this analysis is that the
verbs have the same meanings in the a and b sentences, with any semantic differ-
ences contributed by the constructions themselves.
Type 3. Systematic subsenses. Type 1 above is homonymy. This case is
polysemy, in which more specific senses exist alongside a general sense, or ex-
tended senses alongside a more specific one. So, alongside the general 'transfer'
sense of give and send, there is a more specific 'donation' sense in We gave/sent
$100 to the church (in which the recipient is some sort of institution or cause);
and alongside the general 'travel' sense of sail and fly (Tied up by the kidnap-
ers, I sailed/flew across the lake), there is a more specific agentive sense in / skill-
fully sailed/flew across the lake.
There are two problems here. One is the notorious difficulty of distinguish-
ing homonymy from polysemy. The other is the question of to what extent these
general/specific relationships are systematic. On the latter point: it is typical for
there to be some number of items exhibiting both senses, but for there to be oth-
erwise parallel items that occur only in the general sense (hand; travel) and still
others that occur only in the specific sense (donate; drive). So there is some
question as to whether there are systematic relationships here at all. If there are,
the existence of lexical exceptions of various kinds would seem to demonstrate
that the relationships are to be described by rules of grammar, of some sort (and of
some sort different from derivational rules - though possibly they could express
relationships between alternative subcategorizations).
It's possible that the a and b examples in (1) through (4) are to be analyzed
as involving a more general subsense in the a examples and a more specific one in
the b examples (where their meanings would be compatible with the more com-
plex semantics of the surrounding constructions).
Extragrammatical Relationships
Type 4. (Extragrammatical) conventions of use. This much is grammar.
But not everything that's conventional within a speech community is a matter of
grammar. There can be systematic, but extragrammatical, conventions of use. The
point was made clearly by Morgan 1978 with respect to indirect speech acts, by
Nunberg 1978 with respect to metonymies, by Ferguson 1982, 1983 and Culy
1996 with respect to specialized registers, by Zwicky 1986 with respect to poetic
forms, and by Zwicky & Pullum 1987 with respect to various sorts of playful, ex-
pressive, and concealing forms of language. The extensive literature on systematic
metaphors can be read as making the same point, and a study of conventions of
quotation, naming, numeral systems, and many other phenomena would supply
still more examples.
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One candidate for this status is a metonymy discussed by Nunberg, whereby
a phrase referring to some salient accompaniment of an individual can be used to
refer to that individual, as in the waiter's comment Now the fries wants a Coke
too. I don't think we want to say that there is some derivational rule of English
that converts inflected nouns to base nouns. My guess is that it's conventional -
Sadock tells me that parallel metonymies in Greenlandic Eskimo are just impossi-
ble - but it seems pretty clear to me that it's not derivation or alternative subcate-
gorization, if for no other reason than that the conversion is of entire NPs to con-
stituents with the syntax and semantics of proper names.
Distinguishing extragrammatical conventions from derivational rules can be
quite tricky. The literature on transfers between count and mass (for nouns) and
the various aspectual categories (for verbs) is quite unclear on just this point, and
Michaelis 1999, at least, has worried about just these cases. Just where do we
classify the conversions of mass nouns to count nouns of type or measure (one
beer 'one type of beer' or 'one serving of beer')? These seem conventional - the
possible interpretations of the resulting expressions are very much constrained -
but are they matters of grammar (zero derivation, or possibly alternative subcate-
gorization), or extragrammatical conventions?
The opposite conversions, of count nouns to mass nouns of material (There
was a lot of dog on the road, ugh), seem to many English speakers to be truly
creative uses of the existing material of the language - that is, instances of the
next type.
Type 5. Pure coercion. Here, speakers slot material of one type into con-
texts where it has to be understood in a (literally) unconventional way, if it's to
be understood at all. This is where the verb weird of Verbing weirds language
(from a Calvin and Hobbes cartoon) goes. And, possibly, my verb Chinese in /
Chinesed a lot of vegetables for dinner. English has (as yet) no productive rule
of zero derivation that would convert these adjectives into verbs. But if you do it
on the fly, and the context supports it, you'll be understood as conveying 'make
weird' and 'cook in the Chinese fashion', respectively. The adjectives weird and
Chinese are (adapting Pustejovsky's 1995 term) 'coerced' into verbhood or
(using Talmy's 1988 vocabulary) 'implicity converted' into verbs.6
These purely coercive uses of words do occur, with some frequency; they're
one of the types of 'poetic' language in everyday behavior.
Such uses are creative, from the point of view of the speakers, and notice-
able, from the point of view of those who hear them. Closely related are coinages
that creatively violate rules of derivational morphology (the famous uncola), the
use of mentioned bound morphemes (or even just word-parts) as free-standing
words (ism has managed to make it into the American Heritage Dictionary by this
route), and nonsense-word creation. Rather more distantly related are novel
metaphors and nonconventionalized indirect speech acts (remarking It's cold in
an attempt to get someone to close the window, for instance). The domain of re-
sourceful language use is a huge and varied territory.
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Again, drawing the analytic line is difficult. What starts out as pure coercion
can become extragrammatical convention, if enough people do it. And an extra-
grammatical convention can be reinterpreted as a rule of grammar, if enough peo-
ple do it often enough; that would be an instance of grammaticalization in the
sense of 'becoming grammatical (rather than extragrammatical)', not in its usual
sense of 'becoming grammatical/functional (rather than concrete/lexical)'.
I assume that the actual status of particular phenomena at any given time in
any given speech community can roam all over this map. Different speakers might
have different systems; the systems of individual speakers might change over
time; particular speakers might allow both creative and conventionalized forma-
tions with similar surface forms; and so on. There's absolutely no reason to think
that everyone has to have the same system. All they have to do is mostly under-
stand one another most of the time, which leaves a lot of room for many different
coexisting systems, so long as the pronunciation/use pairings are roughly compa-
rable.
NOTES
1 Not the text of my Forum Lecture at the 1999 Linguistic Institute, but an ex-
ploratory note on a few issues raised in that lecture. The dedication of the lecture
remains: to my colleague and friend Charles Ferguson.
2 Fillmore & Kay themselves attribute this approach to unpublished work by
Orhan Orgun and Jean-Pierre Koenig. The relevant data are some of them staples
of the syntactic literature; others are more recent, from Jackendoff 1990 and
Goldberg 1995, in particular.
3 Don't tax Fillmore & Kay with anything you see here; they might well have
changed their minds about how to analyze these phenomena.
4 Where 'synsem' is adopted from HPSG (Pollard & Sag 1994).
5
I want to make it clear that this is not just logic-splitting. I really believe that a
good account of language structure and use should have a place for all of these,
and that they should be treated as distinct - even if particular instances might be
hard to place.
6 I'm not suggesting that either Pustejovsky or Talmy uses these terms for exactly
the phenomena I'm discussing here.
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